Program
You can download the program of the Cologne Summer School in Philosophy 2023 by clicking here (updated 16.05.2023).
Monday – July 31
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Lecture I: AAA Normativity, and How It Can Apply to Representational States that are not Intentional Actions – Ram Neta
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Public Lecture: The Quest to Discover What is Uniquely Human – Ram Neta
18:00h – 19:00h (CEST)
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Reception
starting 20:00h (CEST)
Lecture I
AAA Normativity, and How It Can Apply to Representational States that are not Intentional Actions
AAA normativity, and how it can apply to representational states that are not intentional actions Ernest Sosa has usefully explained epistemic normativity as a species of a more general performance normativity. I present his explanation, show it can address many of the problems that have been raised for it, and then argue that, in order to extend the framework to apply to representational states that are not intentional acts of any kind, we must regard such states hylomorphically.
Public Lecture
The Quest to Discover What is Uniquely Human
Many people have sought to discover some quality or ability that is uniquely human. To the extent that we need such a discovery, I propose that we can find it by pursuing the analogy drawn in Plato's Republic between the virtue of a person and the virtue of a state. If there is something uniquely human, I propose it is a particular organization of one's capacities. I then elaborate the kind of organization it is by appeal to a reading of Descartes's Meditations.
Tuesday – August 1
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Lecture II: Why the De Se is Crucial to Rationality – Ram Neta
10:00h – 12:00h (CEST)
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Comment: An Experiential Theory of Epistemic Basing – Sophie Keeling (Madrid)
13:30h – 14:30h (CEST)
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Comment: Doxastic Responsibility and Self-Awareness – Buğra Sağsen (Simon Fraser University)
14:45h – 15:45h (CEST)
Lecture II
Why the de se is Crucial to Rationality
I develop the hylomorphism proposed in lecture 1 by presenting a specific hylomorphic account of the act of inferring a conclusion from premises. I then show how this account can generalize to cover all of those representational states or acts that are assessable by the standards of rationality.
Wednesday – August 2 [Day Off]
Thursday – August 3
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Lecture III: The Relation Between Substantive and Structural Constraints of Rationality – Ram Neta
10:00h – 12:00h (CEST)
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Comment: On the Import of Epistemic Akrasia to the Distinction Between Structural and Substantial Rationality – Luis Rosa (Cologne)
13:30h – 14:45h (CEST)
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Lecture IV: An Evidentialist Refutation of Skepticism – Ram Neta
15:00h – 18:45h (CEST)
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Conference Dinner
starting 19:00h (CEST)
Lecture III
The Relation Between Substantive and Structural Constraints of Rationality
Rationality constrains our representational acts and states in two very different ways. First, ourcevidence imposes substantive rational constraints on our representations. And second, logic imposes structural rational constraints on our representations. By understanding these constraints, we can arrive at a better understanding of the sources that impose those constraints – viz., of what logic is, and of what it is to have evidence.
Lecture IV
An evidentialist refutation of skepticism
Once we understand what it is for an agent to have evidence, and we understand what logic is, we will be in a position to appreciate how logic alone can impose constraints on what body of total evidence an agent can possess. By appeal to these constraints, we can demonstrate that an agent who has any evidence for anything at all will have strong evidence against any radical skeptical hypothesis according to which her total evidence is systematically misleading.
Friday – August 4
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Comment: Fragmentation and the Preface Paradox – Ethan Lai (Texas A&M)
10:00h – 11:00h (CEST)
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Comment: Neta on Epistemic Paradoxes: Lotteries, Prefaces, and the New Hybrid Paradoxes – Marvin Backes (Cologne)
11:15h – 12:15h (CEST)
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Lecture V: Why Neither A Priori Nor A Posteriori Justification Is Possible Without the Other – Ram Neta
14:00h – 16:00h (CEST)
Lecture V
Why neither a priori nor a posteriori justification is possible without the other
It's commonly thought that a posteriori justification depends on a priori justification. After reviewing some arguments for this common thought, I show that there are equally good arguments for non-inferential dependence in the other direction as well. Understanding the dependence of a priori knowledge on a posteriori knowledge helps us to appreciate some of the fallacies involved in common arguments against disjunctivism.

